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Abstract
In this paper, I study whether there is any evidence that the market scale sur-
rounding a central administrative o±ce (CAO), which includes corporate headquarters,
in°uences a ¯rm's cost-e®ectiveness in procuring business services. By linking plant-
level data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manufactures with CAO information from
the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments, I examine manufacturing plants' practice of
outsourcing services in relation to the size of the local service market surrounding the
plant and that surrounding the plant's CAO. I found statistically signi¯cant evidence
that the greater the size of local market surrounding a CAO, the higher the plant's
probability of relying on the CAO for outsourcing advertising, bookkeeping and ac-
counting, and legal services. These results are found even after controlling for the size
of the local market surrounding a plant and plant characteristics.
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11 Introduction
Much of urban economics literature treats the ¯rm as a single-establishment entity. Within
such a framework, agglomeration economies in a city are considered to bene¯t only ¯rms
located in that city.1 In reality, however, many ¯rms are composed of multiple establish-
ments, which are not necessarily located in the same geographic area. This paper examines
the possibility of an establishment bene¯ting from agglomeration economies not only in its
local market but also in other markets where a±liated establishments are located.
In my earlier work (Ono [20]), I use data on manufacturing plants to examine the pos-
sibility that plants in larger local markets enjoy more cost reducing bene¯ts by outsourcing
administrative services than plants in smaller local markets. Looking at a manufacturing
plant's outsourcing probability as a function of the local market scale, and controlling for
plant characteristics, I found that a signi¯cant proportion of the variation in outsourcing
across U.S. counties can be explained by the variation in local market scale. However, I
also found that even after controlling for market scale in a location, there remains enormous
variation in a plant's outsourcing probability based on plant characteristics. In particular,
a plant's outsourcing probability drops signi¯cantly if it is a±liated with other plants or es-
tablishments.2 This indicates that a manufacturing plant which has a separate head o±ce or
other plants owned by the same company relies on these establishments in procuring services.
Moreover, it suggests that a plant can bene¯t if the market price of services is lower not only
1For empirical evidence of agglomeration economies, see Ciccone and Hall [5], Henderson [10],
Moomaw [18] and Glaeser et al.[7].
2Take, for example, advertising and bookkeeping and accounting. The results for these services in Ono [20]
indicate that the probability that a plant directly outsources a service drops by 17% and 37%, respectively.
2in its own local market but also in the markets surrounding a±liated establishments.
In this paper, I explore the mechanism behind intra-¯rm sharing of procuring services, fo-
cusing on the role played by a Central Administrative O±ce (CAO). CAOs include corporate
headquarters and other o±ces that perform clerical, administrative, and managerial tasks,
which are essential to any ¯rm. These services can be performed either at the ¯rm's main
operating o±ces or at its factories. Many ¯rms, however, locate their CAOs separate from
their main production facilities, possibly to take advantage of characteristics of other cities
such as the access to information, knowledge spillover from other CAOs, or access to more
competitive suppliers of business services, which are suited to tasks of CAOs. While these
factors are often pointed out in the literature of multi-plant ¯rms and of headquarters (Fujita
and Ota [8], Brecher et al. [4]), little empirical testing of their e®ects has been performed.
This study will focus on the CAO's access to competitive suppliers of services.3 While CAOs
can perform administrative services in-house, they also source such services from an outside
market.4 Therefore, the more competitive the market surrounding a CAO is, the more likely
that outsourcing is performed at a CAO location rather than a plant location, allowing a
¯rm to source services inexpensively. There might be, however, some services which are tied
to the location of the production facility. The e®ects of the market size of a CAO location
in such a case will be also discussed in the paper.
Using data from Fortune 500, Holloway and Wheeler [11] provide evidence that a metropoli-
tan economy's concentration in producer services provides the resources necessary to encour-
3Davis [6] provides evidence that corporate headquarters bene¯t from the existence of other headquarters
within a mile.
4By using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Contract-Out Survey, Murphy [19] found that corporate head-
quarters are more likely to outsource services than non-headquarters establishments.
3age growth in the number of corporate headquarters. Using more complete data from the
Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (see Section 3 for more detailed description of the data),
Davis [6] also provides evidence that a ¯rm will locate its CAOs in a city with more service
suppliers, even after controlling for the population in the city. However, whether or not the
location of CAOs in°uences the e±ciency of remote plants has not yet been studied. In this
paper, I test the hypothesis that a bigger local market scale surrounding a CAO allows its
a±liated manufacturing plants to rely on the CAO for outsourcing services.
To test this hypothesis, I use plant-level data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manu-
factures (ASM) portion of the Longitudinal Research Data Set (LRD) [29], which provides
information on manufacturing plants' outsourcing of administrative and clerical services.5
Outsourcing of such services has been a serious concern of many ¯rms [17]. The corre-
sponding high growth of service industries is also an important economic phenomenon in
recent decades. However, the Census Bureau only started collecting data on the cost of
outsourced services for such services in 1992. In this paper, I use this cost information to
identify whether or not a plant outsourced a given service. Included in this study are four
white-collar services; advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, legal services, and software
and data-processing services.6
In addition to the ASM, I use the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (SAE) [30], which
provides information on supporting establishments, including CAOs.7 In 1992 in the U.S.,
5Plant-level data from the 1997 ASM were not available to this study.
6Siegel and Griliches [9] utilized the cost data of purchased services from the ASM of 1977 and 1982.
However, in these earlier years, the survey included only repair services and communication service, which
are not the focus of this paper.
7Most of the existing literature on corporate headquarters use the data from Fortune 500, which include
only public companies (Silton and Stanley [25], Shilton and Webb [24], and Holloway and Wheeler [11]).
4there were about 47,000 supporting establishments (including CAOs). Firms with such
supporting establishments accounted for 40% of U.S. employment (calculated based on the
1992 Enterprise Statistics) [28]. Of all supporting establishments, about 70% are CAOs,
which are the focus of this paper. Note that the CAOs in the SAE can be linked to the ASM
plants at the ¯rm level by using the common ¯rm identi¯er in both data sets; this provides
a unique opportunity to investigate the intra-¯rm sharing of the role of procuring services.
From these data, however, it is not possible to determine whether a plant relies on its CAO
for outsourcing services. That is, if a plant did not outsource any amount of a given service,
the data do not indicate whether a plant relied on its CAO for the service, or performed the
service in-house. Therefore, in order to examine whether the market conditions surrounding
a CAO have some in°uence on a plant's reliance on the CAO for outsourcing services, I use a
model which links a plant's probability of outsourcing to the market conditions of its CAO.
In Section 2, I present a theoretical model which, unlike the model in Ono [20], allows
a plant to have access not only to its local market but also to the market surrounding its
CAO. In the model, greater local demand for a service induces the entry of more suppliers,
which in turn increases competition and lowers the market price of the service. Thus, if
demand for a particular service is greater in the market surrounding a CAO, more suppliers
will enter that market, lowering the market price of the service at the CAO's location. As
a result, the plant will be more likely to depend on the CAO to outsource the service, and
less likely to outsource the service in its local market.8
In contrast, the SAE is essentially a population survey which contains all auxiliary establishments (which
include CAOs) of multi-plant ¯rms in the U.S Economic Census.
8While some services are not transacted only within a local market, my aim here is not to capture the
e®ect of a whole market size. Signi¯cant coe±cients obtained for my measure of local market scale (at a
5I begin my empirical analysis by constructing an index to measure local market scale as
in Ono [20]. Why this index is created, how it plays an important role in identifying the
e®ect of market size and how the index is constructed are reviewed in Section 4.1. Using the
index, I examine a plant's likelihood of outsourcing a given service in relation to the local
market scale of both the plant's and its CAO's locations. The empirical results presented
in Section 5 show that, for advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services, the
greater market scale at a CAO location does decrease the plant's probability to outsource
the service from its own local market; this indicates that a greater market scale surrounding
the CAO allows a plant to source the service more inexpensively.9
For software and data-processing services, however, the results contradict the prediction
of my theoretical model. The results indicate that as the market scale at a CAO's location
increases, a plant is more likely to directly outsource from \its own" local market instead of
relying on the CAO. A possible reason for this is discussed in Section 5, with a comparison
between software and data-processing services and the three other services.
2 Theoretical Model
Let us consider a city with plants who are ¯nal producers and whose choice of city is ex-
ogenous to the model and intermediate service suppliers whose choice of city is endogenous.
I assume that plants use a service as a production input, and that the market transactions
county-level) prove that the local clustering of business activities in°uences a plant's decision of outsourcing.
9Note that the results of my empirical testings are also consistent with a Dixit-Stiglitz type variety story
in which variety increases with local market size (as in Homes [12]). My results are also consistent with
Hubbard [14], who investigated the contractual form in local trucking markets and found that contracts, or
more vertically integrated organization structure, are more likely to be chosen than simple spot arrangements
when local markets are thin.
6of the service are possible only within the same city. In the model, the technology and the
number of plants in the city determine the local demand for the service, which will determine
the number of service suppliers who decide to enter the local market. The entry process of
service suppliers is modeled using the 2-stage Cournot oligopoly game. Note that I consider
only plants who have a CAO owned by the same parent ¯rm.
Plant's Probability of Outsourcing a Service: In order to procure a service, a plant
can (i) perform the service in-house, (ii) purchase the service from the local market, or (iii)
have its CAO purchase the service in the market in which the CAO is located.10 Comparing
the cost for each case, a plant chooses one of the above three alternatives. I assume that the
plant and the CAO are located in di®erent cities, so that they face di®erent local market
prices.
Let us assume that a plant's in-house production of a service requires only marginal costs
- it occurs in a facility which has already been set up for ¯nal production. I specify marginal
costs of plant i, ±i, as
±i = ±(Ai) + ui; (1)
where Ai is the set of characteristics of plant i and ui a zero-mean random disturbance.
Let us call the CAO of plant i, CAOi, and denote the unit cost of a service when a plant
relies on a CAO for outsourcing the service by ci. ci is essentially the price that the CAO
pays in its local market, which I denote by ~ p. However, taking into account that a plant
10The CAO could also produce the service in-house. However, not introducing this alternative does not
in°uence the main hypothesis derived from the model.
7might not have accurate information on the market price that its CAO faces, I specify ci as
ci = ~ p + ²i; (2)
where ²i is a random component.
Let p stand for the local market price of the service that plant i faces in its local market.
Assuming that services are purchased only from suppliers in the same city, plant i outsources
the service when p < ±i \ p < ci. Assuming that ui and ²i are independent and have
distribution functions F(¢) and G(¢), respectively, from (1) and (2), the probability that
plant i outsources by itself, Pros
i , is written as
Pr
os
i = (1 ¡ F[p ¡ ±(Ai)])(1 ¡ G[p ¡ ~ p]): (3)
The plant's probability to outsource to its local market increases when the market price is
lower in its own local market. However, the probability decreases when the market price is
lower at the CAO's location, since the plant will then be more likely to depend upon the
CAO for procuring the service.
Potential Demand and Outsourcing Demand for a Service: Based on (3), I derive
the demand schedule that service suppliers face. First, suppose all plants were hypothetically
to outsource the service by themselves. Then, for any market price, p, there would be a
resulting demand for the service which I call potential demand. This demand essentially
determines the extent of a market for a service and plays a key role in the empirical testing.
Let us assume that plants have an identical demand function for the service and specify it
as µa(p), where µ is the demand shifter,11 and a(p) is a downward sloping function of price.
11µ can be seen as a share parameter of an underlying Cobb-Douglas production function in a special case
(see Ono [20]).
8In a city with N plants, the aggregate potential demand of the service, Dp is written as
D
p = µNa(p): (4)
Since plants could perform the service in-house or ask its CAO to outsource, in order
to derive the actual demand that service suppliers face, we should consider the probability
that plants outsource by themselves; I call this actual demand the outsourcing demand. By
multiplying the potential demand Dp by the average probability of outsourcing (see (3)), the







(1 ¡ F[p ¡ ±(Ai)])(1 ¡ G[p ¡ ~ p]): (5)
Here I assume that Ai and ~ p are exogenous to the determination of the demand schedule of




;fAig; ~ p); (6)
where Q is the total amount of the outsourced service in the city.
Intermediate Service Suppliers: Facing the city's outsourcing demand schedule, service
suppliers who have entered the local production maximize their pro¯ts with respect to (w.r.t.)
production. Denoting the pro¯t of supplier j in Stage 2 by ¼j, the output level of supplier
j by qj, and the marginal cost by a, we can write ¼j as ¼j = P(
Q
Nµ)qj ¡ aqj. Note that,
while the marginal cost, a, might vary across locations, its relation to the city size is not
clear. While the high wage in a big city might increase a, it should be o®set by higher
labor productivity due to, for example, the knowledge spillover in a big city. Thus, in the
12As I present later, the potential demand shifters, which play an important role in capturing the local
market size, are not correlated between a plant's and its CAO's locations.
9theoretical model, I assume that the marginal cost is the same across geographical areas. In
the estimation, these e®ects are controlled by population.














¡ a = 0: (7)
For simplicity, let us assume symmetry among the suppliers; qj = q =
Q
M 8j. Substituting q
for qj in (7), p is solved as a function of M:13
p = p(M): (9)
The typical solution for the Cournot oligopoly tells that as there are more suppliers in a
market, the price approaches the marginal cost a.
The number of service suppliers M is determined in Stage 1, in which potential suppliers
decide to enter production if their anticipated pro¯ts in Stage 2 exceed the sunk cost of entry
®. Under the assumption of symmetry, M is determined by the zero-pro¯t condition:




From (6), (7), and (10), the equilibrium number of suppliers M¤ is solved as a function of
potential demand attributes, µ and N. Using (9), the equilibrium price is also solved as a
13Let R stand for the second derivative of ¼j w.r.t. qj. From (7), the second order condition (SOC) is
satis¯ed as long as R = 2 P 0
Nµ + P 00
(Nµ)2q < 0: To ensure well-behaved outcomes, I also assume the following
condition which ensures that marginal revenue facing supplier j is steeper than the demand function (Long
and Soubeyran [16]): 2 P 0
Nµ + P 00
(Nµ)2q < P 0






Note also that, in a more general case where the price elasticity of the demand changes with µ and N, p
is solved as a function of M, µ, and N.
10function of µ and N:
p = p
¤(µ;N): (11)
Equilibrium Price at the CAO Location: Then, how is the price determined at the
market surrounding plant i's CAO? Analogous to the process described above, the market
price at CAOi's location is determined by two potential demand attributes in the CAO's city.
These attributes are the demand shifter and the number of plants in the market surrounding
the CAO, and I denote them by ~ µ and ~ N, respectively. Let us denote the market price which
CAOi faces by ~ p. Analogous to (11), ~ p is written as a function of ~ µ and ~ N:
~ p = p
¤(~ µ; ~ N): (12)
In principle, the number of all business establishments, including CAOs who require services,
as well as the intensity of their use of the service would in°uence the market price of the
service. How I deal with this issues in empirical testing is explained in Section 4.1. (See also
footnote 16.)14
Comparative Statics In this section, I show how the equilibrium value for a plant's prob-
ability of outsourcing is changed by the local market size at both the plant's and its CAO's
locations. Note that it is not feasible to empirically test the e®ect of the number of suppliers
M on the probability of outsourcing. Since M is jointly determined with the probability of
outsourcing, M will be correlated with the error term with respect to a presence of ¯xed
14A CAO's purchase of the service could be a very small fraction of the total service transacted in the city.
For example, Davis [6] shows that, even in New York City, total legal services purchased by N.Y. auxiliaries
(which includes CAOs) in 1992 accounts for only 3.6% of all service receipts by law ¯rms in the city. For
accounting services, it is only 1.6%.
11e®ects speci¯c to a local market.15 Therefore, I use the exogenous variables, µ and N, which
determine the level of potential demand, and examine how these local potential demand at-
tributes at a plant's and its CAO's locations in°uence the plant's probability of outsourcing.
Note also that, it is important to distinguish the e®ect of µ (~ µ) from those of N ( ~ N). Be-
cause, as opposed to N ( ~ N), which is measured by county population in the empirical section,
the potential demand shifter (µ) will be calculated for each of four services and will more
narrowly connect the local market scale to a plant's outsourcing decision for a speci¯c service.
From the previous section, under the assumption of symmetry, we know that (6), (7),
and (10) must be met in equilibrium. First, in order to evaluate the impact of µ on the
equilibrium price, I totally di®erentiate the system ((6), (7), (10)) w.r.t. p, q, M, and µ, and







where q¤ is the equilibrium output level of a supplier and R is the second derivative of ¼j
w.r.t. qj. Since R is negative as long as the SOC holds,
dp¤
dµ < 0. Because of symmetry
between µ and N in the model, (13) also implies that
dp¤
dN < 0. Unlike the typical positive
e®ect of the demand upward shift on the price level, in my model, demand increase through µ
and N attracts more service suppliers and enhances the competition among them, resulting
in lower local market price. From (3), the lower market price at a plant location, p, increases
15The state of the local transportation system is one example of such ¯xed e®ects. A better local trans-
portation system might enhance communication between demanders and suppliers and encourage outsourc-
ing, which would attract more service suppliers. The better transportation system at a CAO's location
might also encourage a ¯rm to decide to outsource at the CAO's location as well as increase the number
of suppliers there, which will lead to a super¯cial (negative) relationship between the market scale at the
CAO's location and the plant's outsourcing probability.
12the plant's probability of outsourcing.
Now, let us examine how a plant's probability of outsourcing is a®ected by the exogenous
increase in the local demand in the market where the plant's CAO is located. Analogous
to the relationship between µ (or N) and the market price at a plant's location, greater µ
and/or N at a CAO location lowers the market price in that local market. From (3), this
will make the plant more likely to rely on the CAO for procuring the service, and decreases
the probability that the plant will outsource the service from its own local market, which I
test in Section 5.16
3 Data
I use plant-level data from the ASM compiled in 1992, the ¯rst year when data on the out-
sourcing of white-collar services were collected. While the Census of Manufactures canvases
every manufacturing plant with a limited set of questions, the ASM is a sample survey from
that plant population asking a longer set of questions. Out of the plants in the ASM sam-
ple, I choose those whose data are not subject to imputation. I also focus on plants in the
contiguous, continental U.S. states; this leaves us 45,144 plants.
I supplement these data with the 1992 Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (SAE), which
provides information on CAOs. The SAE collects data on supporting establishments, which
perform services for other establishments of the same company rather than for other com-
panies. This survey is essentially a population survey and inquiries are sent to all auxiliary
establishments of multi-plant ¯rms in the U.S Economic Census. The survey provides a va-









13riety of information, such as establishment location, employment by function, and so forth.
The survey also speci¯cally asks about the principal activity of each auxiliary establishment,
which includes central administration, data-processing, R&D, warehousing, trucking, and so
on. Included in this paper as CAOs are those which indicated their principal activity as
central administration.
Using the common ¯rm identi¯er in the ASM and the SAE, I link the ASM plants to the
CAOs which belong to the same parent ¯rm. Since the SAE covers essentially the population
of auxiliary establishments, merging it with the ASM sample will enable us to categorize the
ASM plants depending on whether there are a±liated CAOs. As shown in Table 1, of 45,144
ASM plants (spread over 2,500 counties), 14,321 plants (31.7%) are single-plant ¯rms, which
I call non-a±liate plants. The rest, 30,823 plants (68.3%), are a±liate plants, which belong
to multi-establishment ¯rms. Of those a±liate plants, 19,788 plants have one or more CAOs
in the same ¯rm. For these plants with CAOs, we can also identify each CAO's location
based on the SAE. This allows us to control for the market conditions at a CAO location in
the estimation.
In Table 2, I show the geographical relationship between plants and CAOs. Of 19,788
ASM plants that have CAOs, most have CAOs in di®erent counties, with many CAOs more
than 250 miles away. This suggests that most plants face di®erent local market conditions,
and therefore di®erent local market prices of services, than their CAOs. In what follows, I
use county as the de¯nition of a local market.17
17Using county instead of PMSA, I could increase the number of geographical units nearly 10 times. This
provides more variability in my measure of the local market scale. The signi¯cant coe±cients obtained for
the measure created at county-level also prove that the clustering of business activities within a county
matters for a plant's choice of outsourcing. Note, however, that analyses at PMSA-level were performed for
the model presented in Ono [20], in addition to the county-level analyses. The qualitative results were not




Plants with CAOs 19,788
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE
Table 2: ASM plants and CAOs location
Number of Plants
Plants with CAOs 19,788
Plants with all CAOs in di®erent counties 16,998
Plants with CAOs 250+ miles away 9,151
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE
Outsourcing Propensities: Next I report the outsourcing propensity of the plants in
our sample. Using the 1992 ASM, I employ the observed cost of outsourcing in determining
whether a plant outsources a given service.18 As shown in Table 3, outsourcing propensities
di®er signi¯cantly, depending on whether or not a plant has a CAO. The percentage of
plants which outsource by themselves is smaller for those which have CAOs, and greater for
those which do not have CAOs. This supports the view that CAOs play a signi¯cant role in
procuring services for their plants.19
di®erent between two cases.
18Plants are asked to report the costs of each service purchased from other companies that are paid directly
by this establishments. Note that when we observe that some amounts are outsourced, it is possible that a
plant also performs a fraction of the service in-house and/or asked the CAO to perform. Assuming that the
fraction is exogenously determined, this will not qualitatively a®ect the main results of the estimation.
19Note also that the outsourcing decision of plants varies within a ¯rm. For example, of the ¯rms with
¯ve ASM plants in the sample, the fraction of those within which all plants outsource was .18.
15Table 3: Percentage of Plants which Outsource
Total Plants with CAOs Plants without CAOs
Number of plants 45,144 19,788 25,356
Advertising .51 .37 .61
Bookkeeping and Accounting .45 .16 .67
Legal Services .52 .38 .63
Software and Data-Processing .46 .45 .47
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE
4 Empirical Implementation
In this section, I derive the empirical model to test my hypotheses. Since we observe only
whether or not a plant directly outsources by itself, we rely on equation (3) for empirical
testing. Using (11) and (12), assuming the linearity between variables and using standard-
ization over the random components speci¯ed in (1) and (2), we can rewrite the probability
that plant i outsources from its local market (see (3)) as follows:
Pr
os
i = P1iP2i; (15)
where P1i = ©[(1;µ;N;Ai)¯];
P2i = ©[(1;µ;N; ~ µ; ~ N)¿];
and ¯ and ¿ are vectors of coe±cients. Note that µ, N, ~ µ, and ~ N are county level vari-
ables. In the above equation, P1i represents the probability that plant i chooses to directly
outsource instead of performing the service in-house, and P2i represents the probability that
plant i chooses to directly outsource instead of depending on its CAO. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, we expect the coe±cients for µ to be positive and those for ~ µ to be negative. Allowing
the variances of u and ² in (1) and (2) to be di®erent, the coe±cients of µ and N in P1 are
di®erent from those in P2, but only in scale.
16As for plant characteristics, I control for plant size, age, industry and a±liation type. I
measure plant size by Beginning-of-Year Asset, which is determined before the decision is
made and is therefore considered exogenous, at least in the short run. Plant age is calculated
based on the ¯rst year a plant started the current business. Both plant size and age are in
logarithmic form. Industry is controlled by 2-digit SIC industry dummies. Another dummy
is used to control for a±liation type.
For N and ~ N, I use population of counties where plant i and CAOi are located, respec-
tively. Note that in the theoretical model where I assumed all plants are identical, N ( ~ N)
stands for the number of plants. However, considering that plant size is di®erent in reality,
the use of population should capture total demand more realistically.
Note that plants in the data set often have multiple CAOs. Of all the CAOs in a ¯rm,
however, the CAO which in°uences a plant's outsourcing decision about a given service would
be the one which is located in a city with a market price lower than that of other CAOs.
To select such a CAO, based on (11) and coe±cients estimated for µ and N in Ono [20],
I choose the CAO which has the lowest inferred market price among all CAOs in the same
¯rm.
Note also that, instead of limiting the sample only to plants with CAOs, I used all 45,144
plants include plants without CAOs; this will increase the e±ciency of parameters commonly
estimated for all categories. For such plants, P2, the probability that a plant chooses local
outsourcing instead of relying on CAOs, is set to 1. I also assume P2 to be 1 for plants
whose selected CAOs are in the same county as the plants.20
20Of 19,788 plants that have CAOs, the number of those that have a selected CAO in the same counties
are about 1,400.









where B stands for the group of plants which have CAOs in di®erent counties, and C stands
for all other plants. Yi is an indicator variable which equals to 1 if plant i directly outsources
the service, and 0 otherwise.
4.1 Index for µ
Here, I summarize how I measure µ for each county. In Ono [20], I showed that the demand
shifter µ is a cost share parameter of the underlying Cobb-Douglas production function. The
cost share parameter represents the intensity of the use of the service, which is likely to be
di®erent across industries. Thus, in order to calculate the demand shifter of a particular
county, I take the average of the intensity of the use of a service over local industries with
share of industry as a weight.
More speci¯cally, let °l stand for the cost share of a given service of industry l at a
national level, and ¾kl the share of industry l in the total output of ¯nal producers in county
k. Following Ono [20], with the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function, µ in





Since the use of a service di®ers across industries, di®erent industrial composition across
counties produces di®erent intensities of the use of a service.21 Note that ~ µ is µ of the
county where the CAO is located.
21Ono [20] provides a table which shows industrial composition di®ers across U.S. counties.
18To calculate µ, it would be ideal to take all industries' potential requirements of a service
into consideration. However, since cost data for services, which allow me to calculate share
parameters, are available only from the data on manufacturing industries to this study, µ
is calculated based only on information of manufacturing sector. The exclusion of other
industries does not change the qualitative result of the empirical estimation, as long as a
service's cost share outside of the manufacturing sector is not systematically di®erent from
that of the manufacturers.22
Based on the cost data from the 1992 ASM, I ¯rst calculate °l for each of 140 3-digit
manufacturing industries. To obtain ¾, I calculate each manufacturing industry's share of
county manufacturing production using the Census of Manufactures in the LRD data set.
Then, to obtain µ for each county, following (17), I take the weighted average of ° by using
¾ as a weight. Table 4 shows the summary statistics for potential demand shifters calculated
for U.S. counties. The standard deviations of the potential demand shifters are quire large
- as much as 30 to 49% of their means.
The plants in the sample are spread over 2,500 counties; this provides variation in µ for
the estimation. Moreover, CAOs of the ASM plants are distributed across more than 500
counties instead of being located in a few major cities, which would also provide variation
in ~ µ and ~ N for the estimation. Note that the correlation between µ and ~ µ is quite small;
22More speci¯cally, µ can be written as µ = µ(µM;µS;µO), where µM is the demand shifter of the










dµM > 0 as long as µS and µO are not systematically (negatively) correlated with µM. By examining
the sign of
dPros
dµM , we could also infer the sign of
@Pros
@µ (how the probability of outsourcing changes with
the demand shifters) based on all sectors.
19Table 4: Variation in Potential Demand Shifters across Counties
All Counties (over 3,000 counties)
Mean S.D.
Advertising .0098 .0048
Bookkeeping & Accounting .0044 .0016
Legal Services .0040 .0012
Software & Data-Processing .0024 .0010
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD
it is 0.0722 for advertising, 0.0306 for bookkeeping and accounting, 0.1081 for legal services,
and 0.0546 for software and data-processing services. This precludes the possibility of multi-
collinearity in estimating the parameters in (15). Note also that in Ono [20], I also examined
how µ correlates with the number of suppliers. I regressed the number of suppliers on µ
and N for each of the four services.23 µ obtained positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, which
justi¯es my use of µ in capturing the e®ect of local market scale.
5 Empirical Results
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation. As discussed in Section 4, note that the
coe±cients of µ and N in P1 must be proportional to those in P2. I performed the esti-
mations both with and without the restriction. For all four services, however, the likelihood
ratio tests suggest the structure is the same for both constrained and unconstrained cases.24
Here I present only the results from the unrestricted maximum likelihood analyses.25 Notice
that, as shown in Table 5, the result obtained for software and data-processing services is
23The data of the number of suppliers are provided in the County Business Patterns.
24The null hypothesis that coe±cients of µ and N in P1 are di®erent from these in P2 only in scale passes
the LM test at 10 % level.
25Note that I also performed the analysis by controlling for the distance between a plant and its CAO.
However, the qualitative results for the variables of interest remained the same.
20somewhat di®erent from that of the other services in terms of the coe±cients obtained for
demand shifters. Below, I discuss each case separately.
Table 5: E®ect of Local Market Surrounding CAO
Dependent Variable=1 if a plant outsources a service
Advertising Bookkeeping Legal Software and
and Accounting Services Data-Processing
µ 4.835** 17.534* 39.205*** 24.330**
(2.49) (1.70) (4.47) (2.30)
N .015*** .0434*** .0419*** .063***
P1 (3.06) (7.85) (8.11) (11.45)
Plant Size .107*** .065*** .237*** .252***
(32.40) (12.53) (46.79) (53.88)
Plant Age .240*** .244*** .237*** .131***
(22.63) (21.20) (21.47) (13.26)
Dummy: A±liate Plant -.204*** -.792*** -.383*** -.163***
(-11.48) (-41.93) (-20.47) (-9.58)
In°uence of the Location of a Selected CAO
µ 6.313 41.925** 55.414*** 75.112**
(1.61) (2.21) (3.79) (2.19)
N .114*** .067*** .036*** .013
P2 (11.26) (6.75) (3.87) (.74)
~ µ -9.800*** -52.699*** -93.837*** 54.824***
(-4.55) (-3.62) (-6.86) (3.20)
~ N -.011 -.020 -.015 .0863***
(-.83) (-1.61) (-1.18) (4.26)
Likelihood Ratio 2.53 0.18 0.72 2.53
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE
( ): Z-statistics
¤: Signi¯cant at 10% Level
¤¤: Signi¯cant at 5% Level
¤ ¤ ¤: Signi¯cant at 1% Level
Note: industry (2-digit SIC) dummies are also included to control for these variables.
Advertising, Bookkeeping and Accounting, and Legal Services: For these three
services, ~ µ obtained positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, which is consistent with my hypoth-
esis. In addition, while they appear insigni¯cant, the coe±cients of ~ N have the expected
sign. Recall that ~ µ and ~ N are both negatively associated with the market price at the CAO
location. Thus, the result suggests that, for these three services, the lower the market price
21that a CAO faces the more likely a plant is to have its CAO outsource the services. Given
the size of the market at a plant's location, the greater scale of the market surrounding the
CAO makes it more cost e®ective to outsource services at the CAO location.
Note that, in contrast to ~ µ and ~ N, both µ and N of a plant's location have negative signs,
which are again consistent with my hypothesis. A plant's probability for a local outsourcing
increases with the size of its own local market and decreases with the size of the market
surrounding its CAO. Plants bene¯t from agglomeration economies in both their own and
their CAO's localities. Recall that, by de¯nition given in (17), the potential demand shifter
represents the intensity of the use of a service averaged over the industries in a market.
Therefore, the statistically signi¯cant coe±cients obtained for both µ and ~ µ indicate that a
plant's outsourcing decision is in°uenced by the industrial composition not only of its local
market but also of its CAO's. High concentration of industries that require intensive use of a
given service will attract more suppliers and lower the market price of the service. Through
intra-¯rm linkage, a plant can enjoy the concentration of such industries in both its CAO's
locality and its own.
Based on Table 5, I calculate the elasticities of the probability of a plant's direct out-
sourcing w.r.t. ~ µ and µ. Di®erentiating Pros w.r.t ~ µ and µ in (15), I obtain:
@Pros
@~ µ
= ©1[(1;µ;N;A)¯]Á2[(1;µ;N; ~ µ; ~ N)¿]¿~ µ (18)
@Pros
@µ
= ©1[(1;µ;N;A)¯]Á2[(1;µ;N; ~ µ; ~ N)¿]¿µ (19)
+ ©2[(1;µ;N; ~ µ; ~ N)¿]Á1[(1;µ;N;A)¯]¯µ:
Based on these expressions, I calculate the elasticities presented in Table 6. These numbers
are evaluated at the mean of the characteristics of 19,788 plants with CAOs, which are
22summarized in Appendix A. In Table 6, ^ Pr1 is the hypothetical outsourcing probability
if a plant did not have a CAO. ^ Pros is the predicted outsourcing probability, taking into
account that a plant actually has a CAO. ^ Pros is much smaller than ^ Pr1, re°ecting the
fact that a CAO plays a signi¯cant role in sourcing services. For advertising, the probability
drops by as much as 27 percentage points, for bookkeeping and accounting, 38 points, and
legal services, 30 points. The numbers in the last two rows show the elasticities of ^ Pros
w.r.t. ~ µ and µ, respectively. Doubling the intensity of use of a service at a CAO location
decreases a plant's likelihood of outsourcing by 10% to 34. Doubling the intensity of use of
a service at a plant location increases a plant's likelihood of outsourcing by 8% to 24. For
example, suppose there are two plants A and B with average characteristics, located in the
same city, but with CAOs in di®erent cities. If, in plant A's CAO's locality, the intensity of
use of advertising services is twice as large as that in plant B's CAO's locality, then plant A's
probability to directly outsource advertising in its own locality is lower than that of plant
B by 10%. However, the outsourcing probabilities for both plants A and B are increased by
8% if the intensity of use of advertising is doubled in their own city.
Table 6: E®ect of µ and ~ µ on the Probability of Outsourcing
Advertising Bookkeeping Legal
and Accounting Services
^ Pr1 0.64 0.54 0.70
^ Pros 0.37 0.16 0.40
Elasticity w.r.t. ~ µ -.104 -.307 -.335
Elasticity w.r.t. µ .076 .26 .24
Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE
23Software & Data-Processing Services: Let us now examine the result obtained for
software and data-processing services. From Table 5, we can see that the coe±cient for ~ µ
and ~ N obtain positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, suggesting that, for software and data-
processing services, the lower the market price a CAO faces, the more likely it is that a
plant will outsource the service by itself instead of relying on the CAO. This is contrary
to my hypothesis. One might suspect that this was caused because some data-processing
performed at CAOs might have been reported by a plant. However, the inquiry that the
Census Bureau sent out to each plant clearly asked the plant to exclude the services provided
by other establishments of the same company, including a separate central data processing
unit. I performed the same estimation while controlling for whether a plant has a separate
data-processing center in addition to CAOs. The result, however, was qualitatively the same.
It could be the case that the costs reported by plants include the signi¯cant amount
of costs spent to purchase software and computer-programming services which directly
help their manufacturing. Examples of such purchases are computer-aided design (CAD),
computer-aided engineering (CAE), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), digital data rep-
resentation, °exible manufacturing system, technical data network and so forth. When a
plant requires new manufacturing software, the plant will also require its employees (soft-
ware users) to be trained by a software vendor so that they can implement the new software.
For training purposes, it would be convenient for a plant to deal with local suppliers
who are more accessible than those who are in the market surrounding its CAO. In such a
case, when a CAO learns the market price is low, it would just advise its plant to outsource
the service instead of performing it in-house. Such e®ects could in principle also exist for
advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services. The result shows that, however,
24for these three services, the e®ect that the lower market prices of a CAO make the CAO
outsource these services for its plants, dominates the e®ect that a CAO advises plants to
outsource.
Summary of the E®ects of Other Plant Characteristics: Finally, I summarize some
interesting ¯ndings on the e®ects of plant size and plant age shown in Table 5. While it
is not a focus of this paper, further examination of these attributes would make interesting
future research.
For plant size, I obtain positive and signi¯cant coe±cients. As discussed in Ono [20],
this indicates the possible existence of scale economies in outsourcing services, which prob-
ably arise from ¯xed costs in service transactions and the searching process for compatible
suppliers.
The coe±cients for plant age are also positive and signi¯cant even after controlling for
plant size. This indicates that older plants have a relative advantage in outsourcing ser-
vices. While this might just re°ect the possibility that older plants renew their outsourcing
contracts, it also suggests that younger plants face di±culties in ¯nding compatible suppliers.
6 Conclusion
While many ¯rms have CAOs which deal with management and administration of ¯rms, little
empirical testing has been performed to identify their in°uence on total e±ciency of ¯rms. In
this paper, I examine one aspect of the CAOs role and provide empirical evidence that a CAO
helps its plants source services inexpensively. In particular, by examining manufacturing
25plants' decisions to outsource business services and how those decisions are in°uenced by
local market conditions surrounding a CAO, I ¯nd that, for advertising, bookkeeping and
accounting, and legal services, the lower the market price to which the CAO has access, the
more likely it is for a plant to rely on the CAO in outsourcing services.
I use industrial composition to construct an index to capture the market price in local
markets. The results show industrial composition has signi¯cant impact in determining
the market price of service. Moreover, it is shown that not only the industrial composition
surrounding the plant but also the composition surrounding the CAOs are important for cost
e®ectiveness of the plant. In particular, this result suggests that, when a CAO is located in
the city with industries which use a given service intensively, suppliers of that service will
be attracted into the city, and lower the market price that the CAO faces. Through the
intra-¯rm provision of services from CAOs to plants, the lower market price at the CAO
location will bene¯t plants located elsewhere.
The empirical ¯nding of this study can be also interpreted as the result of a ¯rm's
choosing its CAO's location so that the CAO can better serve the rest of the ¯rm by sourcing
services inexpensively. The choice of the CAO's location might be important, especially when
locations of operating plants are restricted by factors such as proximity to the consumer
market and accessibility to resources. Having a CAO which specializes in supporting the
rest of a ¯rm might enable the ¯rm to take advantage of a wider range of intermediate service
markets and thus to overcome the limited choices of the location for operating plants.
Then, what are the variables which make a ¯rm decide whether or not to separate busi-
ness administration from operation? How does a ¯rm's size, industrial type, and the number
of plants in°uence such decisions? Examination of these topics would require a model in
26which a \¯rm" is an explicit decision maker which simultaneously chooses both the CAO
and the plant location and where to outsource services. Such research is important for a
greater understanding of the role of CAOs as well as understanding various phenomena such
as geographical concentration and the relocation of headquarters to suburban areas,26 as
well as location decisions of business service industries.27 Studying CAOs would also provide
insight into the role of other supporting establishments such as research & development,
data-processing, and trucking services, and how the location of these establishments in°u-
ences the e±ciency of the overall ¯rm. These will be investigated in future research.




A Selected Services included in the 1992 ASM
mean s.d.
ln (Beginning-of-year asset (thou.)) 8.9 1.8
ln (County population) 12.2 1.6
ln (Age) 2.8 .7
These numbers are calculated for the sample of 19,788 plants with a CAO
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